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FINANCE-INEQUALITY NEXUS: THE LONG AND THE SHORT OF IT
YOUSEF MAKHLOUF , NEIL M. KELLARD and DMITRI V. VINOGRADOV
Financial development affects income inequality differently in the short and in
the long term. Investigating OECD countries from 1870–2011, we find in the short
run, an improvement in financial development tends to reduce inequality, while in the
long run, more finance contributes to more inequality. The short-run effect concurs
with theories advocating financial development increases the availability of financial
services, primarily for the poor. However, this effect becomes nil within a few years.
Results thus imply that policies aimed at reducing inequality through improving access
of the poor to finance need to be carefully designed to ensure longevity of impact. (JEL
O15, O16, D31, G20, E44)
I. INTRODUCTION
The finance-inequality nexus has been the sub-
ject of extensive discussions for a long time (e.g.,
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2007; deHaan
and Sturm 2017; Fischer, Huerta, and Valen-
zuela 2019; Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990;
Kuznets 1955). Moreover, the apparent upward
movement in income inequality over the last
few decades, especially in developed countries,
has increased academic interest in inequality
and its potential determinants (Farias, Scavia,
and Fuentes 2019; Piketty 2005, 2014; Roser
and Cuaresma 2016; Tridico 2017; Xie and
Zhou 2014). A possible factor is financial devel-
opment; however, both theoretical and empirical
studies in the extant literature offer mixed views
with regard to its impact on inequality. Theoret-
ically, improved access to finance should reduce
inequality, while improved quality of financial
services to existing customers may contribute to
more inequality. Empirical studies offer evidence
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of both positive and negative impacts. In this
paper we offer a new perspective by focusing on
the time it takes to reap any gains from changes
in the financial opportunities brought by finan-
cial development. The speed of response to these
opportunities may depend on the individual’s
income level and associated access to financial
services, for which reason the finance-inequality
relation may vary between the short and the long
run. This is exactly what we examine in this
paper.
Theoretical arguments underpinning a rela-
tionship between financial development and
income distribution refer to the ability of the
financial system to cover a larger number of
people (the so-called extensive margin) and/or
to its ability to absorb a larger amount of funds
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from each individual (the intensive margin).1
Underdeveloped credit markets limit access to
financial services for the most risky segment
of households and firms (Banerjee and New-
man 1993), hence, on the extensive margin,
financial development alleviates entry barri-
ers and expands the economic opportunities
of poorer individuals, thus reducing income
inequality (Becker and Tomes 1979, 1986; Galor
and Moav 2004; Paulson and Townsend 2004).2
On the intensive margin, financial development
improves the quality of financial services for
those who already have access to them, most
likely relatively high-income individuals and
well-established firms (Antzoulatos et al. 2016;
Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990),3 thus con-
tributing to more income inequality.4 The overall
impact of financial development is then the super-
position of the two margins: some studies find
a positive nexus (e.g., de Haan and Sturm 2017;
Denk and Cournède 2015; Gimet and Lagoarde-
Segot 2011; Jauch and Watzka 2016; Jaumotte,
Lall, and Papageorgiou 2013) while others show
that financial development has a negative impact
on inequality (e.g., Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and
Levine 2007; Hamori and Hashiguchi 2012;
Kappel 2010; Naceur and Zhang 2016).
1. The terms “intensive and extensive margins” with
regard to the financial industry have been in use since at least
as early as Gurley and Shaw (1967), who, in particular, write:
“Whatever the first choice may be, it is tilled intensively until
there is obvious advantage in trying the extensive margin… ”
(p. 268). Below, we use the same argument to advocate that
because intensive development may be too costly for banks in
the short-run, they opt for the extensive strategy, until, in the
longer-run, they return to the intensive path.
2. For example, Paulson and Townsend (2004) note that
wealthier people may start and expand businesses without
the need for external finance, whilst the poor are financially
constrained and, moreover, for them external finance may be
unavailable. This is evidence in favor of a typical argument of
why financial development works against inequality: it helps
the poor to start businesses. In this case, wealth inequality
(rich vs. poor) defines the opportunity set and, in particu-
lar, the decision to engage in (extra) entrepreneurship, as in
Braggion, Dwarkasing, and Ongena (2018); however, finan-
cial development, through the extensive margin, may cover
more poor people and thus improve their income opportuni-
ties. The latter will have an effect on income inequality but
hardly any immediate effect on wealth inequality. We discuss
the distinction between income and wealth inequality, also in
the context of our research objectives, later in the introduction.
3. Antzoulatos et al. (2016) suggest that as “financial
development gathers pace,” larger and more profitable firms
with greater access to capital markets, tend to increase lever-
age more.
4. See Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2009) and
Beck (2012), for more details about these theoreti-
cal predictions.
We differ from the above literature in that we
stress the relative effects of the extensive and the
intensive margin depend on the length of the time
period considered. Extending financial services
to those who had no access to them earlier, might
require less time than, for example, accumulat-
ing more resources from those already involved
in the financial system, through offering new
and/or better-quality services. This asymmetry in
the realization of the extensive and the intensive
margins of financial development implies asyn-
chronous implications for the income opportu-
nity sets of those affected: while the extensive
margin may first lead to an improvement of the
income stream of the poor, the intensive margin
later would improve the income opportunities of
the rich. While wealth inequality plays a role in
this argument, our focus is on income inequality,
as it is the income opportunity set that is theoret-
ically affected by the financial system. Braggion,
Dwarkasing, and Ongena (2018) offer a use-
ful distinction between the two concepts: while
wealth captures accumulated fortunes, power,
and opportunities of people, income describes
current earnings and determines extra savings
in each period; through opportunity sets, wealth
affects income, yet through savings decisions,
income determines a change in wealth. Alvaredo
et al. (2018) emphasize the link from income
inequality to wealth inequality: they stress it is
the difference in incomes from labor and capi-
tal that reinforces wealth inequality. One would
thus expect income and income distribution to
change faster than wealth and wealth distribution,
which is important for our analysis of short- and
long-run effects of financial development. Con-
veniently, as we discuss below, income inequality
data have recently become available for a longer
time period, as is necessary for our research; such
a long time series for wealth inequality indices is
currently out of reach.
After developing testable hypotheses in the
subsequent section of the paper, to investigate
our theoretical conjecture we require (a) data
over a sufficiently long period of time and (b) a
suitable econometric approach. For the former,
recent research by Madsen, Islam, and Doucou-
liagos (2018) constructed annual data on income
inequality for 21 OECD countries, over the
period of 1870–2011,5 and shows that economic
5. Our focus on OECD countries is also interesting
as the current literature suggests that most developed coun-
tries experienced a sharp increase in inequality over the last
few decades.
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growth is constrained by inequality at lower
levels of financial development. Taking advan-
tage of this, we newly position these inequality
series as the dependent variable. As to the latter
requirement, most of the empirical studies cited
above are based on panel data and use static
models such as ordinary least squares (OLS) and
fixed and random effects models, or dynamic
panel models, particularly employing the GMM
estimator.6 Unlike these approaches, we apply
an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model,
which allows one to distinguish between the
short- and long-run effects of financial develop-
ment on inequality. We use two popular proxies
for inequality—the Gini index7 and the 10%
income share. While the former captures the
overall distribution of income in the population,
the latter isolates the wealthy cohort, helping us
to judge whether, indeed, the short-term effect
of financial development occurs primarily via
the poor. A number of controls are employed
including education, GDP per capita, financial
volatility, and inflation while robustness tests are
carried out to assess whether results are affected
by time-variation, different levels of financial
development, endogeneity, and observation
period length.
Madsen, Islam, and Doucouliagos (2018) pro-
vide the post-tax, post-transfer Gini coefficient;
in other words, the net Gini index, which we
therefore employ in our main analysis. It is
important to note that while other studies, such
as Agnello, Mallick, and Sousa (2012) and Denk
and Cournède (2015), also use the post-tax Gini
index, Delis, Hasan, and Kazakis (2014) and
de Haan and Sturm (2017), among others, use
gross Gini index, and yet others use both gross
and net Gini indices (e.g., Christopoulos and
McAdam 2017). The two measures give different
perspectives on inequality: the former represents
inequality before income redistribution, while the
latter does so after redistribution takes place,
and hence also reflects governments’ responses
to inequality (e.g., van Velthoven, de Haan, and
Sturm 2019).8 Moreover, financial development
6. Some studies use other methods such as panel
Bayesian SVAR (Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot 2011) or IV
regression (Naceur and Zhang 2016).
7. Although the Gini coefficient is the most popular
measure of inequality, it does present some drawbacks. For
example, Galbraith (2012) in his discussion of new inequality
measures cites Pyatt (1976) in noting that whilst the coeffi-
cient can be compared between distributions, it cannot disag-
gregated into subpopulations without difficulty.
8. Interestingly, Ostry et al. (2014) and van Velthoven,
de Haan, and Sturm (2019) examine income redistribution
may affect the two measures differently: for
example, Jauch andWatzka (2016) note that, the-
oretically, by supporting risk taking, financial
development can lead to an increase in gross
Gini; while sharing risks, again due to financial
development, enables households and countries
to potentially decrease their net Gini. Therefore,
although we primarily employ the net Gini given
its long time series availability, as an alterna-
tive approach, we latterly turn to the standard-
ized world income inequality database (SWIID)
which provides data from 1960 including the
gross Gini index.
Over the 142-year sample period, our empir-
ical findings show that a rise in financial devel-
opment reduces the Gini index in the short run,
while increasing it over the longer term. These
results suggest that financial development may
operate chiefly on the extensive margin in the
short run by relaxing credit constraints and thus
widening the availability of financial services for
the poor, lessening inequality. In the long run
however, we observe the opposite effect. Strik-
ingly, the results for the top 10% income share
indicate that growth in financial development
does not significantly affect the rich in the short
run, only over the long run. This provides fur-
ther evidence that the observed short-run effect in
the Gini data comes through the extensive margin
and its effect on the relatively poor. In any case,
in the long run either the redistribution channel
transfers financial gains to the rich, or the inten-
sive margin takes over and reverses the impact
of financial development on income distribution.
This may explain the mixed findings of earlier
studies as the employed empirical models con-
flate the short- and long-term effects. Notably the
only control variable to reduce inequality over the
short and long run is education, whichmay in part
be proxying for financial literacy (see Gill and
Prowse 2015; Kadoya and Khan 2017; Lusardi
and Mitchell 2014).
The organization of the paper is as follows:
Section II presents the literature and theoreti-
cal underpinnings while Section III outlines the
data used. Section IV describes the empirical
employing a dependent variable which is the difference
between market (gross) and net Gini measures. To exam-
ine “finance-related” income inequality on redistribution,
van Velthoven, de Haan, and Sturm (2019) regress income
redistribution on the portion of the market Gini coefficient
explained by financial development, financial liberalization
and banking crises. This work suggests that policymakers
engage in some redistribution in response to increases in
‘finance-related’ income inequality.
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estimation methodology. Section V presents the
findings and several robustness tests. Finally,
Section VI concludes.
II. LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL
UNDERPINNINGS
Our central premise is that financial devel-
opment will likely have differing intertemporal
effects. For the banking sector, Burgess and
Pande (2005) stress that banks themselves prefer
expanding in rich areas, and the relationship
banking literature emphasizes that banks favor
existing customers (Petersen and Rajan 1994;
Berger and Udell 1995; Boot 2000; Agarwal
et al. 2018, to mention a few). From this supply-
side perspective, a credit expansion along
the financial development path should benefit
the richer part of the population. However, in the
short run, financial institutions may be unable to
follow their preferred strategy and may expand
where the demand is more flexible, which is
likely to be the poorer section of potential cus-
tomers. For example, Burgess and Pande (2005)
find, inter alia, that a state-led expansion of the
banking sector into rural areas reduces poverty
via accumulation of deposits and disbursement
of credit among the poor; this change in wealth
is likely to occur due to, and be associated with,
a change in the income opportunities of the poor
cohort. Therefore along with poverty reduction
(less wealth inequality), we ought to witness a
reduction in income inequality.9 Along the same
lines, in Ergungor (2010), opening new branches
improves the ability of the poorer segment of the
population to borrow, while branch presence is
not correlated with mortgage availability in high
income neighborhoods, in particular because
the latter are more likely to qualify for credit
scored mortgages.
Arguably, offering existing [simple] financial
instruments to customers who had no or lim-
ited access to them, is a quicker solution than
developing new financial instruments to meet
the more sophisticated demand of existing cus-
tomers. Similarly, the “keeping up with the Jone-
ses” effect (e.g., Bazillier and Hericourt 2017;
Christen and Morgan 2005; Coibion et al. 2014)
assumes high demand of poorer households for
credit, to help them “keep up” in consumption
9. The increase in income also follows from the increase
in savings, despite an increase in expenditures due to
repayments on credits (assuming nondecreasing consump-
tion expenditures).
with richer households. It is this high demand
that makes it easier for banks to extend credit
to poorer households in the short run.10 While
the above literature focuses on consumption, one
should extend the argument to the income oppor-
tunity set as well (after all, borrowing to boost
consumption should be accompanied by adjust-
ing income to be able to repay the loan in
the future), which would imply a reduction of
income inequality.
In a recent paper, Farias, Scavia, and
Fuentes (2019) theoretically11 investigate the
relationship between credit availability, adoption
of new technologies and inequality. In particular,
in a full liquidity (no credit constraints) state,
investment can lead to faster adoption of tech-
nology and, if the technology is “skill-neutral,”
a reduction in income inequality. However, if the
technology is “skill-biased,” in the sense that it
requires skilled workers, and those workers are
relatively few, inequality can actually increase.
Such an effect is exacerbated when financial
markets are liquidity constrained. This mecha-
nism can, of course, be placed in intertemporal
context. For example, assuming firms are credit
constrained in the short run, the Farias, Scavia,
and Fuentes (2019) result would support the view
that credit expansion benefits the poor (as long as
technology is skill-neutral) and reduces income
inequality. In the long run, with technology
likely to be more skill-biased, credit expansion
may raise the income gap between skilled and
unskilled workers.
Parallels may be drawn between the inequal-
ity impact of financial development and that of
monetary policy shocks that drive shorter-term
credit expansions and contractions. The distribu-
tional effect of monetary policy is a fast-growing
10. As Coibion et al. (2014) note, the above “keeping
up” effect only describes the demand side, yet the overall
relationship between inequality and credit depends on the
supply side as well, which we account for by allowing the
expansion strategy of banks to vary over the short- and long-
run. In this discussion, we have focused on the banking sec-
tor because financial development is usually measured as the
amount of credit issued by domestic financial intermediaries.
Whilst the role of stock and bond markets is outside of this
scope, evidence on their effect on inequality is rather mixed:
for example, developed financial markets may contribute to a
reduction in inequality in Kappel (2010), yet financial devel-
opment measured by stock market capitalization increases
inequality in de Haan and Sturm (2017).
11. Note that their theoretical derivation takes place in
a small country setting. Here technological improvement is
adopted from abroad and involves skill-bias. Additionally,
note that by their Proposition 1, full liquidity corresponds to
the case of complete markets, and insufficient liquidity, to the
case of incomplete markets.
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field of research. Doepke and Schneider (2006)
argue that expansionary monetary policies favor
low income households, while at the same time
low interest rates potentially work against higher
income savers and investors (i.e., those with
higher accumulated wealth). Note that, in line
with our short- and long-term view, wealthier
households would need to readjust their port-
folios to respond to low interest rates, which
takes time, while availability of credit that favors
lower income customers, benefits them imme-
diately. Focusing on the contractionary mone-
tary policy in the United Kingdom. Mumtaz and
Theophilopoulou (2017) provide evidence that it
harms low income households more than high-
earners, who remain by a large extent unaf-
fected; their suggested explanation is via the
higher reliance of the latter category on finan-
cial markets relative to financial intermediaries.
The same directional effect is reported in Furceri,
Loungani, and Zdzienicka (2018), who, on top
of contractions, consider monetary easing, and
show the latter reduces income inequality; effects
of contractions and easing on inequality are
stronger where the share of labour income is
higher. Coibion et al. (2017) also stress the differ-
ent income sources of the wealthy, who receive
a disproportionate fraction of financial income,
and of the poor, who obtain a large share of their
income from transfers. In theU.S. data of Coibion
et al. (2017), contractionary policy appears to
favor the rich as financial income sharply rises
after a monetary policy shock and harms the poor
as real wages rise faster than transfers. Effects
of monetary policy shocks, however, seem to
be different in the short and the long run, in a
similar manner to the intertemporal effects we
advocate for financial development. In El Her-
radi and Leroy (2019), unlike the above studies,
monetary expansion benefits the rich dispropor-
tionately more than the poor; the effect is vis-
ible in the medium run and works through the
asset price channel. Colciago, Samarina, and de
Haan (2019) survey the literature on the distribu-
tional effects of central bank policies; they high-
light the mixed evidence from various studies and
explain this, at least in part, by the multiplicity
of channels through which monetary policy may
affect income (and wealth) inequality. While we
do not study monetary policy effects, we add the
time dimension to this debate.
From the discussion above, the superposition
of the extensive and intensive margins should
generate different effects on incomes, and thus
on the income distribution, in the short and the
long run. Importantly, the extensivemarginworks
primarily through the poorest cohort of popu-
lation, those previously excluded from finance.
The intensive margin, to a larger extent, oper-
ates within the richer part of the population.
Under this paradigm, understanding how finan-
cial development affects each of the cohorts in the
short and the long run will be crucial for policy
design and leads us to two new hypotheses:
H1. Over the short run, the extensive margin
is likely to dominate the intensive margin and
increases in financial development will lead to
decreases in inequality.
H2. Over the long run, the intensive margin will
dominate, and therefore increases in financial
development will lead to increases in inequality.
To examine the above hypotheses, we will
employ a measure of income inequality, such
as the commonly used Gini coefficient, which
covers the whole income distribution. However,
other measures of inequality exist that focus on
the richest cohort, including the top 10% income
share, which might not be so sensitive to the
short-run effects of financial development given
we theorize these affect mainly the relatively
poor. Therefore, our final hypothesis follows:
H3. Over the short run, changes in financial
development will not affect inequality measures
that focus on the relatively wealthy.
III. DATA
This study employs annual data for 21 OECD
countries over the lengthy period of 1870–2011.
Specifically, Table 1 presents the countries12
included in our sample.
The dependent variable is income inequality,
proxied by the post-tax, post-transfer Gini coef-
ficient, that is, the net Gini coefficient. A high
value of this index indicates more unequal dis-
tribution of income. We use the Gini coefficient
because it is the most widely used measure of
inequality in the empirical literature (e.g., Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2007; Braun, Parro,
and Valenzuela 2019; Delis, Hasan, and Kaza-
kis 2014; Denk and Cournède 2015; Jaumotte,
Lall, and Papageorgiou 2013). The main advan-
tage of Gini index is that it covers the entire spec-
trum of the income distribution (Madsen, Islam,
12. The source of much of the data is the excellent
work of Madsen and Ang (2016) and Madsen, Islam, and
Doucouliagos (2018).
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TABLE 1
Sample of Countries
Australia Japan
Austria Netherlands
Belgium New Zealand
Canada Norway
Denmark Portugal
Finland Spain
France Sweden
Germany Switzerland
Greece United Kingdom
Ireland United States
Italy
and Doucouliagos 2018). This is an important
feature as it allows us to investigate the impact of
financial development on income disparity across
different cohorts.13
Next, we follow the literature by using pri-
vate credit to GDP as a proxy of financial devel-
opment (see for instance, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt,
and Levine 2007; Jaumotte, Lall, and Papageor-
giou 2013; Madsen and Ang 2016; Braun, Parro,
and Valenzuela 2019), allowing the comparison
of our findings with other studies. Furthermore,
this index has an advantage over alternative mea-
sures of financial development, such as M2 over
GDP, as it captures the main function of financial
intermediaries, that is, the channeling of the sav-
ings of society to private sector (Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Levine 2007). However, to check the
robustness of our results, we additionally follow
work such as Ang and McKibbin (2007), Gries,
Kraft, and Meierrieks (2009) and Samargandi,
Fidrmuc, and Ghosh (2015) by using the first
principal component of several financial devel-
opment indicators (i.e., the ratios of credit to
GDP, bank assets to GDP, and monetary stock
to GDP14) as a proxy of the aggregate financial
development level.
Several control variables are also employed:
GDP per capita, population, education level,
inflation, financial stability, and the age depen-
dency ratio. These variables are commonly
used in the inequality literature (see, e.g.,,
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2007;
Jeanneney and Kpodar 2011, Delis, Hasan,
and Kazakis 2014; Baiardi and Morana 2018).15
Moreover, we check the robustness of our
13. We use also the top 10 % income share to test the
impact of financial development on the wealthy.
14. The source of the latter two variables is Madsen and
Ang (2016).
15. Some studies control for trade openness and govern-
ment expenditure, however these data are not available for
results to several other control variables such
as technology (Galor and Moav 2000; Jau-
motte, Lall, and Papageorgiou 2013), stock
market capitalization (Aggarwal and Good-
ell 2009; Denk and Cournède 2015; Gimet and
Lagoarde-Segot 2011), globalization (Gimet and
Lagoarde-Segot 2011), and trade unions (Chec-
chi and Garcia-Peflalosa 2010; Machin 1997).
The annual data for GDP per capita and popu-
lation are obtained from the Maddison Project
Database, version 2018 (Bolt et al. 2018). The
primary source of inflation series is Jordà, Schu-
larick, and Taylor (2017), which offers data for
17 OECD countries since 1870, so we obtain
inflation data for remaining countries from the
Varieties of Democracy Institute at the Uni-
versity of Gothenburg (Coppedge et al. 2018).
The source of the globalization index, exports
plus imports to GDP, is Jordà, Schularick,
and Taylor (2017).16 The source of all remaining
variables isMadsen and Ang (2016) andMadsen,
Islam, and Doucouliagos (2018). The appendix
provides a brief definition of all variables, as
well as summary statistics.
Finally, note that we employ annual data given
we wish to analyze both the short- and long-term
effects of finance on inequality. However, more
generally in an inequality context, some studies
(e.g., Delis, Hasan, and Kazakis 2014) prefer not
to use this frequency given (a) annual data may
be noisy, (b) annual inequality data are occasion-
ally imputed, and (c) to circumvent any business
cycle effects (e.g., van Velthoven, de Haan, and
Sturm 2019). As an alternative approach there-
fore, later in the empirical results section we also
employ our data at 5 and 3-year intervals.
IV. METHODOLOGY
Several empirical studies use static panel mod-
els, such as pooled OLS, or fixed and random
effects models, to examine the financial develop-
ment and income inequality nexus (see e.g., de
Haan and Sturm 2017; Denk and Cournède 2015;
Jaumotte, Lall, and Papageorgiou 2013; Kap-
pel 2010; Naceur and Zhang 2016) while others
employ dynamic GMM-type procedures (Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2007; Hamori and
Hashiguchi 2012; Jeanneney and Kpodar 2011).
our long sample period. In addition, the impact of these vari-
ables on income inequality is inconclusive (Delis, Hasan, and
Kazakis 2014).
16. This index is available only for 17 countries.
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Although we estimate static models for our pre-
liminary analysis, and as a comparison with prior
literature, they do not differentiate between short-
and long-run effects (inter alios, see Loayza
and Ranciere 2006) and are therefore unsuitable
to address our particular research question.17
Dynamic GMM-type approaches only model the
short run, again rendering them unsuitable for our
purposes, and can generate spurious results (see
Roodman 2006) when, for example, the number
of countries N in the panel is relatively small
compared with the number of years T .
In this study, we primarily employ a panel
ARDL model18 given this allows us to distin-
guish between short- and long-run effects and
use three estimators typically employed in the lit-
erature (e.g., see Pesaran, Shin, and Smith 1999;
Samargandi, Fidrmuc, and Ghosh 2015); the
mean group (MG), dynamic fixed effects (DFE),
and pooled mean group (PMG). By employ-
ing an ARDL (p, q) approach, Pesaran and
Smith (1995), Pesaran (1997), and Pesaran,
Shin, and Smith (1999) introduce dynamic
heterogeneous panel regressions in an error-
correction form, where p and q are the lags of the
dependent variable and the independent variables
respectively. In our case, this can be written as
follows:
ΔGinii,t = 𝜆i[Ginii,t−1 − {𝛽i,0 + 𝛽i,1Xi,t−1}](1)
+
p−1∑
j=1
𝜃i,jΔGinii,t−j +
q−1∑
j=0
𝜂i,jΔXi,t−j + 𝜖i,t,
where Gini is the Gini index (in logs) for coun-
try i at year t and X is a group of poten-
tial income inequality determinants (in logs19)
including financial development and other con-
trol variables. 𝜃 and 𝜂 refer to the short-run coef-
ficients of the lagged dependent variable and
other regressors respectively, while 𝛽 represents
the long-run coefficients. 𝜆 is the coefficient
17. See Samargandi, Fidrmuc, and Ghosh (2015) for a
useful summary of the shortcomings of static models (i.e.,
pooled OLS, fixed, and random effects) and GMMestimators,
whilst covering the advantages of panel ARDL models. In
particular, they note that ARDL models, such as those that
use PMGestimation (see also Pesaran, Shin, and Smith 1999),
mitigate endogeneity issues given the allowance for potential
lags in the dependent and regressor variables.
18. Samargandi, Fidrmuc, and Ghosh (2015) used an
analogous panel ARDL model to assess the relationship
between financial development and economic growth over the
period 1980–2008.
19. With the exception of financial volatility which is
standard deviation of the log of monthly stock prices within
the year, and inflation.
of speed of adjustment to the long-run equilib-
rium and the first term on the right-hand side of
Equation (1) will capture any long-run relation-
ship between financial development and inequal-
ity. As the system is expected to return to the
long-run equilibrium, we expect 𝜆< 0. Based
on the theoretical discussion in the introduction,
we also expect a negative short-run relationship
between financial development and inequality,
as given by the coefficient 𝜂FDj < 0 (“FD” for
financial development). The same theoretical dis-
cussion implies the opposite long-term relation-
ship, which is given by the coefficient 𝛽FD1 > 0.
By replacing Ginii, t with a measure for top 10%
share, we obtain an alternative model, where
we expect 𝜂FDj = 0, as financial development is
hypothesized to only affect the relatively poor in
the short run.
In terms of estimating (1), the MG approach
of Pesaran and Smith (1995) allows all coeffi-
cients to be heterogeneous, initially estimating
individual regressions for each country and
subsequently, group coefficients are calculated
by averaging country coefficients. Moreover,
Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that this
approach produces consistent estimates of
the averages as long as N and T are reasonably
large. Along such lines, Favara (2003) offer
some words of caution, noting the MG estima-
tor can suffer from sensitivity to both outliers
and small model permutations. For example, in
small country samples, this estimator is probably
inefficient (Martínez-Zarzoso and Bengochea-
Morancho 2004), given the relatively large
number of parameters that require estimation. To
reduce the number of parameters to be estimated,
a very different approach is taken by a second
estimator (i.e., the DFE estimator), whereas aside
from intercepts, other coefficients and error vari-
ances are homogenous across countries, which
might be seen as a rather unrealistic assumption.
Finally, the PMG estimator of Pesaran, Shin, and
Smith (1999) assumes the long-run coefficients
are homogenous across countries but allows for
heterogeneity in the short-run coefficients, the
intercepts, the speed of adjustment coefficients,
and error variances. Such an approach makes
sense if we have grounds to believe the long
run association between financial development
and inequality is the same across our OECD
countries—which ex ante appears plausible,
particularly if we allow the short run paths
to differ. Given this long run homogeneity
assumption holds, which can be tested by a
Hausman test (Li, Wang, and Zhao 2016; Ojede
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and Yamarik 2012), the PMG estimator will be
more efficient than the MG estimator, reduc-
ing the magnitude of the long-run coefficient
standard errors. Note that Pesaran, Shin, and
Smith (1999) show the consistency and asymp-
totic distributions for the PMG estimators, under
certain regularity conditions, in cases where the
regressors are either I(0) or I(1).20 Overall, the
PMG estimator can be viewed as an intermediate
approach between the two extremes of MG
and DFE, and is consequently less likely to be
sensitive to small model issues relative to the
MG approach.
Analogously to the literature, we focus on
PMG and MG estimators21 and use the Hausman
test to choose the most appropriate estimator. The
null hypothesis of the Hausman test is that the
difference between these estimators is not signif-
icant and we employ a 5% level of significance.
Finally, we impose a ARDL lag structure in (1)
as follows; p = 1 and q= 1 (for all regressors)
based on the Schwartz Bayesian criterion. In fact,
this specification, p = q= 1, is not surprising as
it has been widely used in previous studies that
employ ARDL models to test a variety of eco-
nomic issues (see e.g., Li, Wang, and Zhao 2016;
Ojede and Yamarik 2012; Samargandi, Fidrmuc,
and Ghosh 2015).22
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. The Impact of Financial Development on
Inequality
As a prelude to estimating the panel ARDL
model, we employ three static estimators; the
OLS, fixed effects and random effects models
with cluster-robust standard errors at the country
level to control for any potential autocorrelation
and/or heteroskedasticity. Table 2 presents the
results of these traditional estimators.
The three estimators indicate that financial
development has a positive and statistically sig-
nificant impact on inequality. These preliminary
results support the findings of other studies
such as Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot (2011), Jau-
motte, Lall, and Papageorgiou (2013), Denk and
Cournède (2015), and de Haan and Sturm (2017)
that higher financial development leads to higher
20. Samargandi, Fidrmuc, andGhosh (2015) suggest this
obviates the requirement to pretest variables for a unit root.
21. For comparison purposes, we show also results from
the DFE estimator.
22. The results are robust for other lag structures (p = 2
and q = 1 and p = 2 and q = 2), see Table 8.
TABLE 2
Financial Development and Income Inequality
(Static Models)
[1] [2] [3]
OLS FE RE
Financial development 0.083** 0.092*** 0.088***
(2.51) (2.98) (2.94)
Education −0.122 −0.058 −0.061
(−1.27) (−0.56) (−0.59)
GDP per capita 0.010 −0.072 −0.072
(0.16) (−0.94) (−0.96)
Inflation 0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(1.01) (−0.48) (−0.43)
Population −0.009 0.129 0.086
(−0.56) (1.60) (1.45)
Age dependency ratio 0.190 0.137 0.125
(1.20) (1.27) (1.19)
Financial volatility −0.009** −0.007*** −0.007***
(−2.12) (−3.25) (−3.26)
Constant 3.215*** 2.675* 3.107***
(3.43) (1.99) (2.69)
Observations 2,865 2,865 2,865
Notes: t statistics in parentheses.
*p< .10; **p< .05; ***p< .01.
inequality. All these studies use static models,
except Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot (2011) who
employ a structural vector autoregressive model.
This result implies that the intensive margin
dominates the extensive margin. Notably, the
impact of the included control variables appears
limited. Although several coefficients present
signs as expected (e.g., education reduces
inequality while a rise in age dependence
ratio increases the inequality) these are not
statistically significant. The exception is finan-
cial volatility which has a negative impact on
inequality, contradicting the findings of Gimet
and Lagoarde-Segot (2011). However, as we
mentioned in the previous section, these esti-
mators have some potential shortcomings. In
particular, they may generate misleading results
by not distinguishing between potential short-
and long-run relationships or accounting for
other potential econometric issues. To address
these, we next estimate panel ARDL models.
Table 3 shows the results of the PMG,MG and
DFE estimators in columns 1, 2, and 3, respec-
tively. The top part of the table displays the long-
run coefficients while the bottom part presents the
coefficients of the short run. The Hausman test
assesses whether the PMG estimator is signifi-
cantly different from the MG. Given the null is
rejected at 5% level, we might prefer the PMG
given it is efficient. In any case, for all regres-
sions the estimated error-correction coefficients,
MAKHLOUF, KELLARD & VINOGRADOV: FINANCE-INEQUALITY NEXUS 9
TABLE 3
Financial Development and Income Inequality
(ARDL Models)
[1] [2] [3]
PMG MG DFE
Long-run coefficients
Financial development 0.128*** 0.057* 0.145***
(7.22) (1.80) (2.62)
Education −0.136*** −0.489** −0.201**
(−2.64) (−2.28) (−2.11)
GDP per capita −0.069* 0.032 −0.155***
(−1.84) (0.45) (−3.06)
Inflation 0.001 −0.380*** 0.000
(1.32) (−4.04) (0.58)
Population −0.017 −0.279* 0.149
(−0.40) (−1.85) (1.23)
Age dependency ratio 0.007 0.110 0.326
(0.09) (0.66) (1.21)
Financial volatility 0.010** 0.009** 0.023***
(2.28) (2.22) (2.64)
Short-run coefficients
Error-correction coefficient −0.054*** −0.164*** −0.028***
(−5.25) (−10.81) (−4.90)
ΔFinancial development −0.013* −0.029*** −0.013**
(−1.72) (−2.96) (−2.08)
ΔEducation −0.167** −0.117 −0.059
(−2.31) (−1.62) (−1.28)
ΔGDP per capita 0.037* 0.024 0.044**
(1.72) (1.02) (2.30)
ΔInflation 0.022 0.045*** −0.000
(1.63) (3.31) (−1.30)
ΔPopulation 0.152 −0.260 0.253
(0.75) (−0.80) (1.52)
ΔAge dependency ratio −0.043 0.008 −0.014
(−0.42) (0.06) (−0.21)
ΔFinancial volatility −0.000 −0.000* −0.000
(−0.47) (−1.88) (−1.57)
Constant 0.231*** 1.108*** 0.064
(5.18) (5.59) (1.36)
Observations 2,843 2,843 2,843
Hausman test 1.40
p value .99
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. The lag structure is p = 1 and
q = 1 based on SBC. p value represents the p value of the Hausman
test for poolability. PMG is more efficient estimation than MG under
the null hypothesis.
*p< .10; **p< .05; ***p< .01.
𝜆, are negative and highly significant in all regres-
sions, thus the null hypothesis of no long run
relation is rejected. All estimators generate anal-
ogous results regarding the effect of financial
development on inequality in both the short and
long run, and below we focus on the findings of
PMG estimator.
From Table 3, in the short run, it would appear
that increases in financial development decrease
income inequality, providing evidence for H1.
This supports the extensive margin view that
higher financial development tends to broaden
the access to financial services, particularly for
low-income individuals who had previously not
been using such services. The long-run coeffi-
cients tell a different story; that financial devel-
opment has positive and statistically significant
effect in all regressions. This implies that higher
financial development leads to higher inequality,
supporting both the initial findings of the static
models and H2.
As discussed earlier, a possible explanation of
these opposing effects in the short and long run is
that extensive financial development (improving
access to finance of the poorest segment) that
dominates in the short run, is later dominated by
the exploitation of the intensive margin (serving
existing relationship customers) in the long run.
We further investigate this mechanism later on
by testing the impact of financial development
on the top 10% income share, thus explicitly
focusing on the richer cohort alone. In any case,
the differential impact in the short and long run
may explain the mixed evidence provided by
previous studies, highlighting the importance of
distinguishing between the intertemporal effects
of financial development on inequality.
Turning to the control variables education is,
as expected, negatively related to inequality in
both short and long run. However, unlike the prior
static regressions, education is now typically sta-
tistically significant, underlining the usefulness
of using an ARDL-type model. Additionally, as
noted in the introduction, education is positively
associated with financial literacy (see Gill and
Prowse 2015; Kadoya and Khan 2017; Lusardi
and Mitchell 2014), and it seems reasonable to
suggest that part of education’s reducing effect on
income inequality relates to the increased ability
to make competent financial decisions.
The results show also that GDP growth has
a positive impact in the short run and a nega-
tive impact in the long run. This implies that the
wealthy mainly benefit from economic growth
in short run, while the distribution of this gain
widens over the long run, reducing inequality.
This finding is consistent with early work such as
Kuznets (1955) who posits that by shifting labor
from sectors with low productivity to sectors with
high productivity, economic growth first leads to
an increase in income inequality before it can
decrease later on (more recent studies of the rela-
tionship include, inter alia, Adams Jr 2004; Dol-
lar, Kleineberg, and Kraay 2016). Furthermore,
financial volatility shows the expected positive
impact, particularly in the long run, which is now
in line with Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot (2011).
The impacts of the remaining control variables
are statistically insignificant.
As a next step, we check the robustness
of our previous PMG results by re-estimating
Equation (1) with several other factors that may
affect inequality.
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In the first column of Table 4, we control for
the impact of technology on inequality. Technol-
ogy can increase inequality by raising the skill
premium, which widens the wage gap between
skilled and unskilled workers (Jaumotte, Lall,
and Papageorgiou 2013). Furthermore, it may
also lead to higher unemployment via enhancing
the use of labor-saving capital. In the second col-
umn, we use trade unions to capture the impact
of labour market institutions that can influence
wage inequality and thereby income inequal-
ity (see Checchi and Garcia-Peflalosa 2010;
Machin 1997). In the third column of Table 4,
we consider the impact of globalization, proxied
by trade openness. The results, particularly in
the long run, support literature that suggests a
positive impact of globalization on inequality.
In the fourth column, we control for the effect
of the relative magnitude of financial markets.
Similarly to private credit share, financial mar-
kets are also measure of financial development
and its impact on income distribution is ambigu-
ous. On the one hand, the development of the
equity market can increase investment levels by
providing additional financing sources to the real
economy, which could reduce income inequal-
ity via transferring wealth from creditors to
debtors (Aghion and Bolton 1997). On the other
hand, financial markets can also lead to higher
inequality as large firms disproportionately ben-
efit from stock market development (Aggarwal
and Goodell 2009). In the fifth column, we
test the robustness of our findings by using an
alternative measure of financial development.
Specifically, we follow other studies such as
Ang and McKibbin (2007) and Gries, Kraft, and
Meierrieks (2009) by using the first principal
component of the ratios of credit to GDP, bank
assets to GDP, and monetary stock to GDP as an
aggregate proxy of financial development.
A multicollinearity concern may arise due to
a possible relationship between our financial sta-
bility measure and financial development. For
example, de Haan and Sturm (2017) suggest that
financial development leads to banking crises,
which, in turn, are associated with lower financial
stability. To address this issue, we measure the
variance inflation factor (VIF) of FD and finan-
cial instability. The VIF of both variables is rel-
atively small at 2.08 for financial development
and 3.10 for financial stability. Additionally, in
Table 4 (column 6), we test the robustness of
our results by estimating the model with no con-
trol for financial volatility—results stay qualita-
tively unchanged.
Overall, our financial development results
seem robust to controlling for these additional
factors with negatively signed and significant
financial development coefficients in the short
run and positively signed and significant long-
run coefficients for all regressions in Table 4,
therefore providing further evidence for H1 and
H2. Moreover, the results for education shown
in Table 3 are predominantly carried over to
Table 4. Turning to the newly added controls
themselves, none show a significant impact on
the short run, except trade openness which has
significantly negative impact, while in the long
run, all the relevant coefficients are significant
and in line with the theory suggested above. For
instance, technology and globalization have a
positive and significant impact on inequality in
the long run. The impact of financial markets
is also positive, which supports our previous
finding about the long-run effect of financial
development. Notably, our only additional con-
trol to reduce inequality significantly is trade
unions. Finally, our results are also robust to
the employment of the alternative measure of
financial development.
TheGini index is themainmeasure of inequal-
ity used by previous studies as it covers the entire
spectrum of the income distribution; however, it
is important to examine the impact of the finan-
cial development index on othermeasures. There-
fore, we next estimate the impact of financial
development on the top 10% income share, allow-
ing us to capture the impact of financial develop-
ment on the wealthy.
Table 5 shows the results of these estima-
tions. The negative and significant error correc-
tion coefficient across all estimators suggests that
the null hypothesis of no long run relation is
rejected. The Hausman test statistic is not avail-
able,23 however all estimators show the analo-
gous impact of financial development on top 10%
income share for both short and long run. In par-
ticular, the results show that financial develop-
ment does not affect the top 10% income share in
the short run yet leads to higher top income share
and thus higher inequality, in the long run. These
results provide further color to our previous find-
ings presented in Tables 3 and 4. The increasing
availability of financial services for the relatively
poor reduces inequality in general (as measured
by Gini index) but this does not imply any effect
on the rich in the short run (as measured by top
23. As the model fails to meet the asymptotic assump-
tions of the Hausman test.
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TABLE 4
Financial Development and Income Inequality (PMG Sensitivity Analysis)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Technology
Trade
Union Globalization
Stock Market
Capitalization
to GDP
Aggregate
Financial
Developmenta
Without
Financial
Volatility
Long-run coefficients
Financial development 0.142*** 0.074*** 0.088*** 0.079*** 0.084***a 0.135***
(7.10) (4.02) (4.69) (4.59) (6.75) (8.02)
Education −0.196*** −0.077 −0.209*** −0.137*** −0.093*** −0.143***
(−3.58) (−1.57) (−3.94) (−2.96) (−2.76) (−2.72)
GDP per capita −0.059 −0.003 0.068* 0.004 −0.116*** −0.02
(−1.52) (−0.10) (1.76) (0.12) (−3.83) (−0.85)
Inflation 0.001 −0.004 −0.887*** −0.008** −0.001*** −0.006
(1.28) (−1.28) (−4.99) (−1.96) (−2.77) (−1.64)
Population −0.098** 0.203*** −0.088** −0.095** 0.020 −0.027
(−2.23) (3.22) (−2.01) (−2.49) (0.58) (−0.66)
Age dependency ratio 0.008 −0.212*** −0.142* −0.028 0.075 0.019
(0.11) (−2.77) (−1.75) (−0.40) (1.18) (0.26)
Financial volatility 0.011** 0.006** 0.003 0.007* 0.004
(2.57) (2.35) (0.67) (1.93) (1.03)
R&D intensity 0.053***
(3.11)
Union membership −1.256***
(−14.96)
Stock market capitalization to GDP 0.063***
(4.19)
Trade openness 0.120***
(5.06)
Short-run coefficients
Error-correction coefficient −0.054*** −0.064*** −0.055*** −0.056*** −0.061*** −0.0514***
(−5.11) (−4.22) (−4.13) (−4.42) (−5.13) (−4.81)
ΔFinancial development −0.014* −0.019*** −0.021** −0.013* −0.012*a −0.015**
(−1.73) (−2.69) (−2.01) (−1.75) (−1.87) (−1.99)
ΔEducation −0.170** −0.154* −0.105** −0.171** −0.158** −0.168**
(−2.07) (−1.89) (−2.27) (−2.24) (−2.09) (−2.27)
ΔGDP per capita 0.041** 0.045** 0.070*** 0.037* 0.041* 0.035
(2.01) (2.05) (2.60) (1.77) (1.95) (1.64)
ΔInflation 0.013 0.027* 0.060*** 0.022 0.023 0.022
(0.87) (1.90) (2.63) (1.59) (1.59) (1.64)
ΔPopulation 0.111 0.062 0.090 0.154 0.159 0.136
(0.52) (0.32) (0.44) (0.84) (0.86) (0.72)
ΔAge dependency ratio −0.030 −0.048 −0.023 −0.034 −0.116 −0.037
(−0.30) (−0.46) (−0.19) (−0.33) (−1.16) (−0.36)
ΔFinancial volatility −0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.000 0.000
(−0.22) (−1.06) (0.97) (−0.78) (0.52)
ΔR&D intensity −0.015
(−1.36)
ΔUnion membership −0.128
(−1.41)
ΔStock market capitalization to GDP 0.001
(0.20)
ΔTrade openness −0.022**
(−2.01)
Constant 0.279*** 0.173*** 0.265*** 0.246*** 0.266*** 0.204***
(5.04) (4.05) (4.06) (4.41) (5.06) (4.74)
Observations 2,843 2,843 2278b 2,843 2,843 2,881
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. The lag structure is p = 1 and q = 1 based on SBC. aThe aggregate measure of financial
development is the first principal component of the following financial indicators: the ratios of credit to GDP, bank assets to GDP,
and monetary stock to GDPb. Trade openness is available only for 17 countries.
*p< .10; **p< .05; ***p< .01.
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Table 5
Financial Development and Top 10% Income
Share (ARDL Models)
[1] [2] [3]
PMG MG DFE
Long-run coefficients
Financial development 0.115*** 0.074* 0.132***
(5.86) (1.92) (4.21)
Education −0.042 −0.384 −0.286***
(−0.63) (−1.28) (−3.58)
GDP per capita −0.081** 0.119 −0.109**
(−2.22) (0.73) (−2.32)
Inflation 0.000 −0.809* 0.000
(1.15) (−1.86) (0.87)
Population −0.094** −0.399* 0.093
(−2.37) (−1.69) (0.96)
Age dependency ratio −0.000 0.175 0.025
(−0.00) (0.61) (0.17)
Financial volatility 0.012*** −0.002 0.014**
(3.01) (−0.29) (2.03)
Short-run coefficients
Error-correction coefficient −0.057*** −0.161*** −0.035***
(−6.51) (−8.62) (−6.21)
ΔFinancial development 0.008 −0.007 0.001
(0.96) (−0.71) (0.26)
ΔEducation −0.024 −0.010 −0.012
(−0.60) (−0.24) (−0.30)
ΔGDP per capita −0.003 −0.019 0.014
(−0.14) (−0.66) (0.84)
ΔInflation 0.024 0.051*** −0.000**
(1.34) (3.40) (−2.12)
ΔPopulation 0.068 0.127 0.224*
(0.31) (0.52) (1.81)
ΔAge dependency ratio 0.011 0.056 0.058
(0.12) (0.62) (0.98)
ΔFinancial volatility −0.000 0.000 0.000
(−0.94) (0.15) (0.17)
Constant 0.277*** 1.055*** 0.143***
(6.30) (4.24) (2.90)
Observations 2,843 2,843 2,843
Hausman test n/a
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. The lag structure is p = 1 and
q = 1 based on SBC. p value represents the p value of the Hausman
test for poolability. PMG is more efficient estimation than MG under
the null hypothesis.
*p< .10; **p< .05; ***p< .01.
10% income share) and supporting H3. However,
the relaxation of credit constraints disproportion-
ately benefits the wealthy in the long run using
both measures of inequality.
In Section II we reviewed the growing field
of research on the distributional effects of mon-
etary policy, which offers a mixed view: some
find monetary expansions reduce inequality
(Doepke and Schneider 2006; Mumtaz and
Theophilopoulou 2017); Furceri, Loungani, and
Zdzienicka 2018), while others find expansions
favor the rich, at least in the medium and long
run (El Herradi and Leroy 2019). In our data,
we cannot easily distinguish between monetary
policy effects (whereby monetary expansion
may boost credit, and thus affect our measure of
financial development) and other factors (such as
technological) of financial development. There-
fore, the measure of financial development we
use, being credit-based, should be qualified. If
it is the improved availability of credit to the
poor that drives the income-inequality reducing
effect of monetary policy, as in Doepke and
Schneider (2006), then our findings empha-
size the short-lived nature of this effect, with a
reversal within a few years (below we demon-
strate the effect disappears once one moves to
5-year averages). Regarding the longer-term
“inequality-increasing” effect through asset price
dynamics, as in El Herradi and Leroy (2019), our
findings support such directionality in the long
run, yet suggest it may be not only the increased
income from asset holding but also a more gen-
eral improvement in the income opportunity set
of the rich that drives the effect.
B. Further Empirical Results and Robustness
Although using 14 decades of annual data
importantly provides farmore degrees of freedom
than much of the extant literature, it is also useful
to explore whether the finance-inequality nexus
may present some time-variation. To do so, we
divide the full sample into two subsamples (early
and late).24 Table 6 below shows the PMGmodel
in Table 3, re-estimated employing the new sub-
samples.25
We focus on the PMG estimator given it
is efficient according to the Hausman test at
the 5% level. Importantly, the results in Table 6
again show the positive relation between finan-
cial development and income inequality in the
long run and the negative relation in the short run,
occurs in both subsamples. The only exception is
that any short-run effect of financial development
appears statistically insignificant before 1950.
The significance of the short-run effect post-1950
is perhaps indicative of banks being more con-
scious of expanding their customer base.
Next, we compare the distributional impact
of FD across different financial systems. To do
so, we classify the systems into three levels
(developed, intermediate, and underdeveloped)
using the quartiles of their financial development
in each observation-year: specifically, the top
and the bottom quartiles are classified as devel-
oped and underdeveloped respectively, while the
24. We follow Madsen, Islam, and Doucouliagos (2018)
by estimating our model before and after 1950.
25. From now on, for brevity, we only report the esti-
mates for our key variables of interest; controls are the same
as before.
MAKHLOUF, KELLARD & VINOGRADOV: FINANCE-INEQUALITY NEXUS 13
TABLE 6
Financial Development and Income Inequality
(PMG Estimator) of Early and Late Subsamples
Early Late
[1] [2]
Long-run coefficients
Financial development 0.045*** 0.135***
(3.19) (3.59)
Controls Yes Yes
Short-run coefficients
Error-correction coefficient −0.113*** −0.074***
(−3.99) (−2.92)
ΔFinancial development −0.014 −0.045**
(−0.98) (−2.51)
ΔControls Yes Yes
Constant Yes Yes
Observations 1,504 1,260
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. The lag structure is
p = 1 and q = 1. The p value of the Hausman test of early
and late subsamples is 0.43 and 0.06, respectively. The early
subsample is from 1870 to 1949 while the late subsample uses
data from 1950 to 2011. The early subsample includes only
20 countries due to the availability of financial volatility data
for Greece. Controls are those employed in Table 5 but are
omitted to save space.
*p< .10; **p< .05; ***p< .01.
intermediate category includes observations in
the second and third quartiles.We thus effectively
examine a type of nonlinearity in the relation-
ship between financial development and inequal-
ity and Table 7 presents the results.
The findings show that the short-run coeffi-
cients are analogous across the three systems,
indicating that an innovation in financial devel-
opment reduces income inequality regardless of
the level of financial system. On the other hand,
a positive and significant long-run coefficient is
associated only with intermediate and higher lev-
els of development, being statistically nil for
low levels. This supports our conjecture that the
reduction in inequality is due to the extensive
margin, which only requires there are people
lacking access to standard financial products and
services. For the intensive margin to work, there
needs to be a large group of sophisticated users of
complex financial services and products, which is
more likely to hold for higher levels of financial
development. This is exactly where we observe
the significant long-run effect that counteracts the
short-run reduction in inequality.
Moving on, we check the robustness of our
main findings using different lag structures in the
panel ARDL model. More specifically, we re-
estimate our results presented in Table 3 using
p= 2 and q= 1, as well as p= 2 and q= 2. Note
TABLE 7
Financial Development and Income Inequality
(PMG Estimator)
Different Systems
Long-run coefficients
FD (underdeveloped system) 0.028
(1.33)
FD (intermediate system) 0.036**
(2.14)
FD (developed system) 0.072***
(4.69)
Controls Yes
Short-run coefficients
Error-correction coefficient −0.063***
(−5.11)
ΔFD (underdeveloped system) −0.018**
(−2.21)
ΔFD (intermediate system) −0.018**
(−2.16)
ΔFD (developed system) −0.018**
(−2.22)
ΔControls Yes
Constant Yes
Observations 2,843
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. Underdeveloped FD are
systems in 25th percentile of FD, developed FD are systems
in 75th percentile of FD, and intermediate FD are systems
between these two extreme categories.
*p< .10; **p< .05; ***p< .01.
that although the lag structure, p= 1 and q= 1,
is selected based on SBC and used in Table 3,
using an additional lag of the dependent variable
is a useful practice to investigate the robustness of
our results to potential types of endogeneity. For
example, Fischer, Huerta, and Valenzuela (2019)
find that inequality also affects access to credit
in a reverse-causality effect. Pesaran, Shin, and
Smith (1999) demonstrate that an ARDL model
provides consistent coefficients despite the pos-
sible presence of endogeneity given appropri-
ate lags of dependent and independent variables.
The new results confirm our main findings, see
Table 8.
While we use annual data in our previous anal-
ysis, primarily dictated by our wish to focus on
short-term as well as long-term effects, we now
employ 5-year intervals to assess the financial
development-inequality nexus. Although lower-
ing the degrees of freedom, this allows us to
abstract somewhat from business cycle fluctua-
tions (i.e., to focus on the medium- and long-run
effect of financial development on inequality).
Importantly, however, this means that the short-
run impact may become insignificant.
Table 9 presents the results of employing
5-year observations. The results of the PMG
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TABLE 8
Financial Development and Income Inequality (ARDL Models Using Different Lag Structures)
p= 2, q= 1 p= 2, q= 2
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
PMG MG DFE PMG MG DFE
Long-run coefficients
Financial development 0.122*** 0.046* 0.138*** 0.126*** 0.041* 0.146***
(7.10) (1.79) (2.72) (5.69) (1.66) (2.84)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Short-run coefficients
Error-correction coefficient −0.058*** −0.177*** −0.030*** −0.042*** −0.190*** −0.032***
(−5.06) (−11.46) (−4.85) (−4.09) (−10.82) (−5.10)
ΔGini index (−1) 0.079** 0.096*** 0.063 0.061 0.085*** 0.061
(2.40) (3.32) (1.62) (1.62) (2.61) (1.54)
ΔFinancial development −0.016** −0.029*** −0.013** −0.019** −0.029*** −0.014**
(−2.17) (−2.95) (−2.13) (−2.12) (−2.63) (−2.02)
ΔFinancial development (−1) −0.002 −0.014** −0.001
(−0.22) (−1.98) (−0.10)
ΔControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ΔControls (−1) Yes Yes Yes
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,840 2,840 2,840 2,821 2,821 2,821
Hausman test 1.96 n/a
p value .96
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. p value represents the p value of the Hausman test for poolability. PMG is more efficient
estimation than MG under the null hypothesis. This estimation takes place over the whole sample period.
*p< .10; **p< .05; ***p< .01.
estimator, the efficient estimator as suggested by
the Hausman test, confirm our previous results,
particularly the positive impact of financial
development on income inequality in the long
run. As expected, the short-run coefficients are
statistically insignificant, as collapsing the data
does not allow us to capture the short run effect.
As a corollary, these results suggest also that
the positive effect of an innovation in finan-
cial development on income distribution lasts
less than 5 years. This is consistent with the
length of the period estimated by El Herradi
and Leroy (2019) for the peak positive effect of
a monetary expansion on the share of national
income held by the wealthy.
Finally, our estimates above are based on net
Gini indices from Madsen, Islam, and Doucou-
liagos (2018). To robustify our conclusions, we
turn to the SWIID as an alternative source of
inequality data (see Solt 2019, for methodolog-
ical issues). SWIID is available from 1960 and
provides the gross Gini index, along with the
net index. As noted in the introduction, the two
measures provide before and after redistribu-
tion assessments of inequality respectively. This
point potentially strengthens the implications of
TABLE 9
Financial Development and Income Inequality
(ARDL Models 5-Year Intervals)
[1] [2] [3]
PMG MG DFE
Long-run coefficients
Financial development 0.112*** 0.068 0.200***
(8.51) (1.47) (2.84)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Short-run coefficients
Error-correction coefficient −0.363*** −0.747*** −0.117***
(−6.05) (−8.70) (−4.56)
ΔFinancial development 0.004 −0.032 −0.001
(0.28) (−1.30) (−0.08)
ΔControls Yes Yes Yes
Constant Yes Yes Yes
Observations 555 555 555
Hausman test 7.30
p value .40
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. The lag structure is p = 1
and q = 1. p value represents the p value of the Hausman test for
poolability. PMG is more efficient estimation than MG under the
null hypothesis.
*p< .10; **p< .05; ***p< .01.
our prior findings, as the inequality-increasing
impact of FD, where inequality is measured
after possible redistributional interventions of
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TABLE 10
Financial Development and Income Inequality, Gross and Net Gini (3-Year Intervals)
Gross Gini SWIID Net Gini SWIID
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
PMG MG DFE PMG MG DFE
Long-run coefficients
Financial development 0.098*** 0.933 0.132*** 0.174*** −0.418 0.072
(5.73) (1.15) (4.05) (10.45) (−0.74) (0.97)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Short-run coefficients
Error-correction coefficient −0.452*** 9.695 −0.246*** −0.371*** −5.124 −0.222***
(−4.17) (0.96) (−6.09) (−3.36) (−0.50) (−10.16)
ΔFinancial development −0.044 0.568 −0.017 −0.039 −8.360 0.013
(−1.52) (0.38) (−0.73) (−1.08) (−0.90) (0.61)
ΔControls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336
Hausman test 0.00 0.00
p value 1.00 1.00
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. The source of SWIID Gross and net Gini indices is Solt (2019) and these data are available
from 1960.
*p< .10; **p< .05; ***p< .01.
governments, is alarming. As in the previous
exercise, to abstract from business cycle fluc-
tuations and other concerns about annual data,
we construct time intervals, yet the rather short
(compared to our main sample) availability of
data dictates we should not employ 5-year peri-
ods and opt to use 3-year periods instead (e.g.,
an approach adopted by Delis, Hasan, and Kaza-
kis 2014). Table 10 presents the results of this
estimation and note here that PMG is again the
efficient estimator. Although the series is shorter,
the result for both gross and net Gini is analogous
to Table 9 when we collapse the data: the find-
ing of the inequality-increasing effect of financial
development in the long run.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper examines the impact of financial
development on income inequality and in par-
ticular, develops new hypotheses which suggest
a difference in the short- and long-run impacts.
Using suitably lengthy data, specifically a sample
of OECD countries over the period 1870–2011,
our main finding is that financial development
has a negative impact on income inequality in
the short run but a positive impact over the long
run. The results suggest that, in the short run,
financial development operates primarily on the
extensive margin by relaxing credit constraints
and increasing the availability of financial ser-
vices for the poor. As a result, an improvement
in financial development leads to a reduction in
income inequality in the short run. In the long run,
however, the effect is the opposite—the wealthy
appear to benefit more.
Our results emphasize the importance of con-
sidering the intertemporal relationship between
finance and the income distribution. This pro-
vides a message for policy-makers: short-term
inequality benefits from policies aimed at credit
expansion may vanish or even become harmful
in the long run. To avoid this, complementary
policies may be needed in the aftermath of credit
expansion, such as, for example, fiscal redistribu-
tion through progressive income tax and regula-
tion and/or financial education aimed at helping
households not to take on excessive amounts of
credit. Finally, as more data becomes available,
more research needs to examine the long- ver-
sus short-run nexus advocated in this paper, in
contexts such as developing countries, where the
extensive margin can potentially take longer to
work than the intensive margin.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1
Variable Definition
Variable Definition
Gini coefficient The post-tax, post-transfer Gini coefficient
Top 10% income share Income share held by highest 10%
Financial development bank credit to the non-bank private sector divided by nominal GDP
Education The fraction of the school age population that is enrolled in primary, secondary and
tertiary schooling
GDP per capita Real GDP per capita
Inflation The change in consumer price index
Population Population in thousands
Age dependency ratio Age dependency ratio computed as the fraction of the population outside working age
(15–64)
R&D intensity The ratio of R&D to nominal GDP
Trade union The ratio of union membership to economy-wide employment
Financial volatility The standard deviation of the log of monthly stock prices within the year
Stock market capitalization to GDP The ratio of Market capitalization of listed domestic companies to GDP
Bank assets to GDP Claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by deposit money banks as a share of
GDP
Monetary stock to GDP Broad money is the sum of currency outside banks; demand deposits other than those
of the central government; the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of
resident sectors other than the central government; bank and traveler’s checks; and
other securities such as certificates of deposit and commercial paper
Trade openness to GDP The sum of imports and exports to
GDP ratio
TABLE A2
Summary Statistics
Obs. Mean SD
Gini index 2,982 3.492 0.233
Top 10% income share 2,982 3.538 0.230
Financial development 2,982 3.537 1.034
Monetary stock to GDP 2,940 0.744 0.593
Bank assets to GDP 2,940 0.863 0.859
Education 2,982 3.918 0.449
GDP per capita 2,933 9.196 0.905
Inflation 2,903 2.605 50.101
Population 2,982 9.352 1.274
Age dependency ratio 2,982 4.051 0.144
R&D intensity 2,982 −0.541 1.361
Union membership 2,940 0.188 0.164
Financial volatility 2,940 1.299 3.137
Stock market capitalization to GDP 2,940 3.065 1.080
Trade openness to GDP 2,351 −1.073 0.654
Notes: All variables in logarithms except inflation and financial volatility.
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